A technical identity needs a purpose, an owner and a lifecycle. An inventory helps, but its value depends on linking records to actual access and dependencies.
An identity needs a purpose
When I find a technical account, my first question is which service depends on it. Its name may suggest a function, but it does not prove that function still exists. I need to connect the identity to a process, an owner and the resources it uses.
An application may have several identities, and an integration may use different mechanisms across environments. Recording those relationships helps identify dependencies before changing permissions or credentials. We should also distinguish who approves access scope from who maintains the implementation. If everything is assigned to “IT”, the inventory field is complete, but we may still have nobody who can explain whether access remains necessary or what would break if it were removed.
Record the purpose
Link each identity to an application, workload or agent. Document owner, environment, accessible resources and authentication mechanism without storing secrets in the inventory.
Find where the identity is actually used
I would start by combining information from identity systems, cloud platforms, applications and secret inventories. Each source shows only part of the picture. A registered account may have several credentials, and a key found in a repository may belong to an identity on another platform.
The inventory should contain references and metadata, never copies of secrets. We need to know where they are held and who can retrieve them. I would also review deployments, scheduled jobs and integration processes, where undocumented dependencies may appear. Usage logs help check the stated purpose if we understand their coverage. Missing events can mean missing visibility, a periodic activity or a retired service. We must establish which situation applies before deciding what to remove.
The lifecycle of a non-human identity
- RegisterPurpose, owner, service and environment.
- AuthorizePermissions limited to required operations.
- UseTraceable authentication and activity.
- ReviewUsage, credentials, permissions and dependencies.
- RetireRevoke access and verify its effect.
Function or environment changes require scope review; retirement must account for consumers.
Constrain and review access
Separate identities by function and environment where feasible. Evaluate short-lived credentials and federation against actual platform support.
Separate identity, credential and permission
These elements are related but different. An identity represents the service; a credential authenticates it; permissions determine what it can do afterwards. Changing a password does not fix an excessive role. Deleting a key does not prove there is no other authentication mechanism.
I would prefer temporary credentials or workload-associated identities where the platform and application support them. This reduces some secret handling, but still requires appropriate permissions and control over who can run the workload or act as that identity. If a long-lived secret is necessary, I would define storage, distribution, rotation and recovery from failure. The change must be tested with the application, including instances that may retain the previous credential.
Example: a service integration
An integration reads a repository and writes results to another system. Instead of reusing a shared account across environments, evaluate a dedicated identity restricted to the required operations. Its record should explain who approves those permissions and which service will stop working if they are revoked. If a long-lived credential exists, make custody and rotation explicit.
Review permissions without losing the function
To adjust an existing identity, I would first choose a specific function and record its required operations. Reading a resource, writing results and administering a service are different capabilities. An integration may have received a broad role during implementation and retained it even though routine activity is much narrower.
Logs can help prepare a permission proposal, but may not show every legitimate activity. We should check with the owner and consider period-end processing, maintenance and recovery. The review must include who can configure the identity, issue credentials or use it from another workload. That indirect access can matter more than the permission visible inside an application.
I would test the new scope with allowed operations and others that should be denied. I would also document failure handling, so the immediate workaround is not to restore a full administrative role without review.
After testing, record results, the permission version and affected consumers. If the application changes, revisit the scope. There is no need to wait for an audit: a new integration, change of owner or additional environment are natural points to confirm that the identity still represents the same function and its privileges remain necessary. This makes access review part of service maintenance rather than an isolated inventory exercise.
Plan retirement
Define what happens when an application is retired or ownership changes. Test revocation and review dependencies before deleting credentials.
Retire safely and revoke effectively
For planned retirement, I would first check consumers, execution frequency and dependencies. An integration that runs only at month-end can appear inactive for weeks. I would review the purpose with its owner and test removal within a controlled scope where possible.
A compromise changes the objective: we need to stop unauthorized use and activate the response procedure. We must know what each action actually revokes and which credentials or sessions remain valid. Creating a new credential does not necessarily invalidate every previous one. The plan must identify affected authentication mechanisms and checks that confirm containment. We can then restore the legitimate function with reviewed permissions, rather than automatically returning to the configuration that allowed the problem.
Avoid an inventory without context
Counting identities does not explain risk on its own. It is more useful to identify identities with no owner, elevated privileges or no link to an active service. A lack of recent use is a signal to investigate, not automatic proof that an identity can be deleted.
Agents belong in this model too
If an agent uses tools, I need to identify the identity it acts through and the permissions it receives. I also need to know who initiated execution and whether it acts under user delegation or its own service identity. Without that distinction, we may attribute an action to the integration without knowing which request triggered it.
To assess progress, I would review identities with validated owners and purposes, broad permissions awaiting review, long-lived credentials and tested retirements. I would not simply aim to reduce the total count: separating functions can increase identities while improving control. Every identity needs a rationale, scope and lifecycle. Reviews must continue when the application, supplier or responsible team changes, so the inventory stays connected to actual operation.
Further reading
Official sources for checking and exploring these concepts. This article presents a practical approach; it does not reproduce the references’ full requirements.
Examples are illustrative. Implementation decisions should be adapted to each organization’s requirements and dependencies.